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Abstract
In this paper we study convex games with an inﬁnite countable set
of agents and provide characterizations of this class of games. Some
diﬃculties arise when dealing with these inﬁnite games, especially to
tackle the vectors of marginal contributions. In order to solve these
problems we use a continuity property. Inﬁnite sequencing situations
where the number of jobs is countable inﬁnite and the related cooper-
ative TU games are introduced. It is shown that these inﬁnite games
are convex and the marginals associated with some orders turn out to
be extreme points of the core.
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11 Introduction
The class of convex games with transferable utility and with ﬁnite number
of players was introduced by Shapley (1971). There are several equivalent
ways to introduce this class of games. Supermodularity, increasing marginal
contributions (groups and individuals), marginals in the core or the core is
equal to the Weber set, are examples of these equivalent formulations.
I nt h i sp a p e rw ec o n s i d e rc o o p e r a t i v eTU games where the set of players
is countable inﬁnite. The concept of convexity can be extended, in a natural
way, to these games. However, we will show that many problems arise when
we try to ﬁnd characterizations for this class of inﬁnite games. In particular,
to assure that the vector of marginal contributions with respect to any order is
in the core, we need to introduce an additional property. This is a continuity
property and it guarantees, for instance, that we can reach the worth of an
inﬁnite coalition from monotonic sequences of ﬁnite coalitions.
A ﬁnite sequencing situation arises when a (ﬁnite) number of jobs has
to be processed in a machine, according to a certain order and one tries to
optimize a cost function. Given a sequencing situation we can associate to it
the cost related to its initial order as the sum of the costs of the jobs, where
t h ec o s to fj o bi is given by the product of its cost per unit of time, αi, and
t h et i m et h a ti ts p e n d si nt h es y s t e m ,i . e .i t ss e r v i c et i m e ,pi, plus the waiting
time for completing all the jobs that precede i in the queue. The problem
related to a sequencing situation is to determine the optimal order of the
jobs. Smith (1956) proved that the optimal order can be obtained reordering
the jobs according to decreasing urgency indices, where the urgency index of
job i is deﬁned as ui = αi/pi.
If the jobs belong to the same agent he will agree to reorder optimally,
according to the previous result. The situation is completely diﬀerent when
each job belongs to a diﬀerent agent. In this case, we can tackle the situation
involving two or more interacting agents through an Operations Research
Game (see Borm et al, 2001), and a reordering requires that at least the
agents involved agree on the new order. So we can say that a switch among
two jobs is always possible if they are consecutive in the initial order or if
all the agents that own one of the jobs in between the two that are switched
agree. If all the agents agree, the optimal order can be obtained, generating a
cost savings with respect to the initial order. The following question arises: Is
it possible to share this cost savings among the agents in such a way that the
new order results to be stable? In other words, we want to ﬁnd a fair amount
2to be given to the diﬀerent agents, in such a way that all of them agree on
the optimal order and have no incentive to recede from the agreement. This
situation ﬁnds its natural habitat in cooperative Game Theory.
In 1989 Curiel, Pederzoli and Tijs introduced the sequencing games. An
updated survey on these games can be found in Curiel et al (2002). A ﬁnite
sequencing game is a pair (N,v) where N is the (ﬁnite) set of players, that
coincides with the set of jobs, and the characteristic function v assigns to
the players of a coalition S the maximal cost savings they can obtain by
reordering only their jobs. Curiel et al (1989) show that ﬁnite sequencing
games are convex games and, consequently, balanced. A balanced game is a
cooperative TU game with a non-empty core.
In this paper, we deal with cooperative TU games where there is a count-
able inﬁnite number of agents. In the next section we present three equivalent
formulations of convexity for games with a countable number of players. Sec-
tion 3 is devoted to the study of the marginals for these inﬁnite games. In
Section 4 we analyse inﬁnite sequencing situations and show that, for some
orderings, the marginals are extreme core elements of the corresponding co-
operative TU games. Some comments about extensions of these inﬁnite
sequencing games and other remarks are given in Section 5.
2C o u n t a b l e I n ﬁnite Convex Games
Ac o o p e r a t i v eTU game can be represented by (N,v), where N is the set of
players and the characteristic function v assigns to each group (or coalition)
of players S ⊂ N the value v(S), which stands for the reward to the members




i∈N xi = v(N),a n d
(Coalitional rationality)
P
i∈S xi ≥ v(S), for all S ⊂ N.
We are interested in extending the concept of a ﬁnite convex game to the
situation with a countable inﬁnite player set. For this purpose we introduce
ad e ﬁnition of convex games for those with N = N.T o a v o i d c o n v e r g e n c e
problems we will restrict to nonnegative games with bounded value.
Deﬁnition 1 An inﬁnite game (N,v) is called convex if and only if
v(S1 ∪ {i}) − v(S1) ≤ v(S2 ∪ {i}) − v(S2),
3for all S1,S 2 ⊂ N,i∈ N such that S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ N\{i}.
An extra condition is needed in order to assure that if a game is convex,
then
(i) v(S)+v(T) ≤ v(S ∪ T)+v(S ∩ T), for all S,T ⊂ N,
holds, i.e. the game is supermodular. This condition is usually known as the
Inner Continuity Property (ICP):




where S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ ...and
∞ [
k=1
Sk = S. An inﬁnite game is inner continuous if
it is inner continuous at every coalition S.
A st h en e x te x a m p l es h o w st h i si sn o tar e d u n d a n tc o n d i t i o ni fo n es e e k s
to reach the value of a coalition in this inﬁnite context.
Example 3 Consider the inﬁnite unanimity game (N,u N) and its restric-
tions to the ﬁrst n players present. In this case, uN (N)=1and it can not be
reached from the limit of the values of the corresponding ﬁnite games, which
are always 0.
Proposition 4 If the game (N,v) is convex and inner continuous, then it
is supermodular.
Proof. Given S,T ⊂ N, let S\T = {s1,s 2,s 3,...} with s1 <s 2 <s 3,....N o t e
that this is possible because each subset of the natural numbers has always a
smallest element, and S\T can be ﬁnite or inﬁnite. Then, taken into account






v(S ∪ T) − v(T)=
X
r≥1
(v((T) ∪ {s1,...,sr}) − v((T) ∪ {s1,...,s r−1})) (2)
4where for convenience {s1,...,s r−1} = ∅ for r =1 .
Since each term in the sum of (1) is by hypothesis not larger than the corre-
sponding term in (2), assumption (i)
v(S)+v(T) ≤ v(S ∪ T)+v(S ∩ T), for all S,T ⊂ N,
holds.
In a similar way, it can be shown that another kind of continuity has to be
considered when we try to achieve the value of a coalition from a monotonic
non-increasing sequence of coalitions.




where S1 ⊃ S2 ⊃ ...and
∞ T
k=1
Sk = S. An inﬁnite game is outer continuous if
it is outer continuous at all coalitions.
In order to analyse the convexity, in the next theorem we give equivalent
formulations which lead to convex games when the inﬁnite game is continu-
ous. An inﬁnite game is continuous if it is inner and outer continuous. The
proof is left to the reader because the main steps resemble those in the ﬁnite
case (cf Branzei et al, 2005).
Theorem 6 G i v e na ni n ﬁnite continuous game (N,v), the following asser-
tions are equivalent:
(i) v(S)+v(T) ≤ v(S ∪ T)+v(S ∩ T), for all S,T ⊂ N;
(ii) v(S1 ∪ U) − v(S1) ≤ v(S2 ∪ U) − v(S2), for all S1,S 2,
U ⊂ N such that S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ N\{U};
(iii)( N,v) is convex.
In a similar way, the notion of concavity can be introduced by reversing
the inequalities. As in the ﬁnite case, when we consider a countable inﬁnite
number of agents, we are interested in those types of games which turn out
to be convex/concave. Finite bankruptcy and sequencing are two of the best
known situations which give rise to convex games. In this countable inﬁnite
setting, it can be shown that inﬁnite bankruptcy games with ﬁnite total
claims are convex. The case of inﬁnite sequencing situations is analysed in
Section 4. Airport games with a countably inﬁnite player set and bounded
total cost can be seen as concave games.
53 The Marginals of Countable Inﬁnite Games
There are many characterizations of ﬁnite convex games, for instance, there
is a well-known with ﬁve criteria (see, e.g. Branzei et al, 2005). In the ﬁnite
case Weber (1988) proved, by induction on the number of players, that the
core is always included in the convex hull of the so-called Weber allocations.
In his proof Derks (1992) uses a separation theorem. Shapley (1971) stated
that if the game is supermodular, then the core and the Weber set coincide.
Ichiishi (1981) showed that if the marginal vectors are core elements for all
orders of the player set, then the game is convex. Thus, for ﬁnite games, the
core is equal to the Weber set if and only if the game is convex.
In this inﬁnite setting, before we can introduce a suitable Weber set we
have to look at the orders in N.U s i n gt h ef a c tt h a te a c hs u b s e to fN always
has a least element, all orders in N can be written through the predecessors
and/or successors of the members of a partition that each order σ induces in
N. For instance, partitions induced in N by the natural order σ1 =( 1 ,2,3,...)
and the reverse order σ2 =( ...,3,2,1) consist in only one class: that of
the smallest element 1. The elements in σ1 can be written by listing the
successors of 1, while for σ2 we have to use its predecessors. On the other
hand, if we consider σ3 =( 1 ,3,5,..., ...,6,4,2), i.e. ﬁrst the odd numbers
in the natural order and, then, the even numbers in the reverse order, we
can reconstruct the sequence using the successors of 1 inside its class and the
predecessors of 2 which are in his own class.




k1 ∩ σk2 = ∅, for all k1 6= k2 such that k1,k 2 ∈ Σ ,a n dΣ =
{k ∈ N|k is the smallest element in σk}. Note that σk can be ﬁnite or in-
ﬁnite and Σ is always non-empty since 1 ∈ Σ.
In a convex game with a countable number of players, (N,v), the marginal




σ (i) ∪ {i}) − v(P
σ (i))
where Pσ (i) represents the set of predecessors of i in σ. Note that in this
context it is not obvious that a marginal vector has to be in the core of a con-
vex game. Example 3 illustrates this fact because the marginal contributions
are 0.
Theorem 7 If the inﬁnite game (N,v) is convex and continuous, then mσ (v)
is in the core of (N,v), for all σ.
6Proof. For the sake of brevity, in the sequel we denote by mσ the marginal














i∈σk (v(Pσ (i) ∪ {i}) − v(Pσ (i)))
´
= v(N),
where the last equality holds because we are dealing with a generalized tele-
scopic sum of a countable number of nonnegative terms and the game is
continuous.





i∈S (v(Pσ (i) ∪ {i}) − v(Pσ (i))) ≥
X









(v(Pσ|S (i) ∪ {i}) − v(Pσ|S (i)))
´
= v(S)
where Pσ|S (i)=Pσ ( i) ∩ S. The inequality holds because the game is non-
negative and convex, and the last equality follows from the fact that there is
a countable nonnegative telescopic sum and the game is continuous. Thus,
the marginal vector mσ, for all order σ, is in the core of the inﬁnite game
(N,v).
The marginal vectors are not only in the core, but they are also extreme
points as the next result shows.
Theorem 8 Let (N,v) ac o n v e xa n dc o n t i n u o u si n ﬁnite game. For all order
σ, mσis an extreme point of the core.
Proof. (i) To prove that mσ is an extreme point of the core, C (v),w en e e d
to show that for pairs x,y ∈ C (v) with mσ = 1
2(x+y) we have x = y = mσ.
(ii) We claim that
P
i∈S mσ
i = v(S), for S of the form Pσ (σ(k)) and
also of the form Pσ (σ(k)) ∪ {σ(k)} with k ∈ N. Using continuity the ﬁrst




i in generalized telescopic sums. The second






σ (σ(k))) + m
σ
σ(k) = v(P
σ (σ(k)) ∪ {σ(k)}).
7(iii) Consider a pair x,y ∈ C (v) with mσ = 1
2(x+y).N o t et h a tf o rs u c h





yi = v(S), (3)
for each S ∈ 2N with
P
i∈S mi = v(S).Taking into account (ii) and (3) we






v(Pσ (σ(k)) ∪ {σ(k)}) − v(Pσ (σ(k))) = mσ
σ(k)
and it also holds that yσ(k) = mσ
σ(k). Thus, we can conclude that x = y = mσ.
Therefore, if we consider the Weber set as the closure (in the weak topol-
ogy) of the convex hull of all marginal vectors, cl(conv{mσ |σ ∈ Π(N)}),
w eh a v es h o w nt h a ti ti sc o n t a i n e di nt h ec o r eo fa ni n ﬁnite convex game,
assuming that it is continuous.
4 Sequencing Situations with Countable Num-
ber of Players
In this section we consider that there are countably many jobs and, equiva-
lently, a countably inﬁnite number of agents. The diﬀerence between these
situations and the semi-inﬁnite ones, introduced in Fragnelli (2001), is that
in the latter paper the number of jobs is inﬁnite but the number of agents
is ﬁnite. Therefore, in the so-called inﬁnite sequencing situations the set of
agents can be represented by N and we suppose that they are numbered as
they are in the queue in front a counter (machine). Thus, we are assuming
that the initial order coincides with the natural order of N. As in the ﬁnite
case, for inﬁnite sequencing situations if two con s e c u t i v ej o b sh a v ei n c r e a s i n g
urgencies it is possible to reduce the cost with a switch. A set of jobs T is
connected according to an order σ if
σ(i) <σ (k) <σ (j) ⇒ k ∈ T,
for all i,j ∈ T and k ∈ N. Switching two connected jobs i,j the change in
cost is given by αjpi − αipj ( n o t et h a tt h ev a r i a t i o ni sp o s i t i v ei fa n do n l y
8if the urgency indices verify ui <u j); if the variation is negative the switch
does not take place. We denote the gain of the switch by:
gij =( αjpi − αipj)+ = max{0,α jpi − αipj}














i.e. the total gain that can be obtained reordering the jobs is bounded.
Deﬁnition 9 G i v e na ni n ﬁnite sequencing situation, the corresponding in-




v(T) ∀ S ⊂ N.
where S/σ is the partition in connected coalitions induced by the order σ.
Remark 10 We are interested in inﬁnite sequencing games such that if we
consider the ﬁnite sequencing situations in which keep only the ﬁrst n jobs and
the corresponding sequence of ﬁnite games ([1,n],v n),w h e r e[1,n] denotes
the set {1,2,...,n}, we can obtain the characteristic function of this inﬁnite
sequencing game (N,v) as:
lim
n→+∞vn (S ∩ [1,n]) = v(S),
for all S ⊂ N. This means that, in the sequel, we will focus on inﬁnite
sequencing games which are inner continuous.
Since ﬁnite sequencing games turn out to be convex games, a natural
question is to look for a similar property for inﬁnite sequencing games.
Proposition 11 Let (N,v) be the inner continuous sequencing game corre-
sponding to an inﬁnite sequencing situation. Then (N,v) is a convex game.
9Proof. Since ([1,n],v n) is convex because it corresponds to a ﬁnite sequenc-
ing situation, we have vn (S ∩ [1,n])+vn (T ∩ [1,n]) ≤ vn ((S ∪ T) ∩ [1,n])+
vn (S ∩ T ∩ [1,n]), for all S,T ⊂ N. Taking the limit for n → +∞, by the
ICP we obtain (i) of Theorem 6. So (N,v) is a convex game.
For ﬁnite sequencing games interesting core elements are known. Curiel
et al (1989) show that it is possible to determine a core allocation without
computing the characteristic function of the ﬁnite sequencing game. They
propose to share equally between the players i,j the gain gij produced by
the switch and call this rule to obtain an allocation the Equal Gain Splitting











gij ∀ i ∈ N.
There exist two other simple allocation rules, denoted respectively by P
and S. According to the ﬁrst the gain of each switch is assigned to the
predecessor in the initial order, while the second assigns the gain to the








gji ∀ i ∈ N
and it is easy to see that EGS = 1
2(P + S).
In a similar way, we can deﬁne the EGSε solution for each ε ∈ [0,1] as:
EGS
ε = εP +( 1− ε)S,
where for ε =0we obtain S,f o rε = 1
2 we get EGS, and for ε =1we have
P.
I nt h ec a s eo fi n ﬁnite sequencing games and referring to the gain splitting
rules, it is easy to prove that P and S belong to the core. In fact, eﬃciency



























10Consequently, by the convexity of the core, we have that also EGSε
belongs to the core for all ε ∈ [0,1].
Since we are assuming that the initial order coincides with the natural


























The following result shows that these allocations are not only in the core,
b u tt h e ya r ee x t r e m ep o i n t so ft h ec o r ew h e nt h eg a m ei sc o n t i n u o u s .
Proposition 12 P and S are extreme points of the core of the corresponding
inﬁnite continuous sequencing game.









is an extreme point, let x,y
be two core allocations such that P = 1
2(x+y).W ew i l ls h o wt h a tx = y = P
t h r o u g ha ni n d u c t i o np r o c e d u r e .

















Thus, consequently, x1 ≤ P1.
Since the inequality y1 ≤ P1 can be derived similarly and P1 = 1
2(x1 + y1),
we obtain x1 = y1 = P1.
Now, we suppose that xj = yj = Pj,f o ra l lj =1 ,...,k−1, and we are going
to prove that xk = yk = Pk.
















and then xk ≤ Pk.
Similarly, we obtain yk ≤ Pk a n dt a k i n gi n t oa c c o u n tt h a tPk = 1
2(xk + yk),
11it holds xk = yk = Pk.








is an extreme point, let
x,y be two core allocations with S = 1
2(x+y). We will show that x = y = S.
By coalition rationality, we have x1 ≥ v(1) = 0 = S1 and y1 ≥ S1 can be
derived in the same way. Since S1 = 1
2(x1 + y1), then x1 = y1 = S1.
Assume that xj = yj = Sj,f o ra l lj =1 ,...,k− 1. We will prove that
xk = yk = Sk.












and, applying the hypothesis, xk ≥ Sk. The related inequality, yk ≥ Sk,i s
obtained using a similar procedure. As Sk = 1
2(xk+yk) we can conclude that
xk = yk = Sk.
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
We have proved that the closure of the convex hull of all marginals is con-
tained in the core, when the inﬁnite game is convex and continuous. It could
be interesting to know under which conditions the core of an inﬁnite convex
game is included in this Weber set.
In Curiel et al (1994) it is proved that ﬁnite sequencing situations with
regular and additive cost functions are balanced. This result can be extended
to inﬁnite sequencing games. In fact, P and S are core elements. Similarly, as
in the ﬁnite case, one can prove that S is the unique drop out monotonic solu-
tion (cf Fernández et al, 2005) and P,S and EGSε are population monotonic
allocation schemes.
Since we know from Remark 10 that v(S) = limn→∞ v(S∩[1,n]), we may
approximate P,S and EGSε with the corresponding solutions in a suitable
ﬁnite game ([1,n],v n).

































satisfy Pi −Pi(vnδ) <δand Si −Si(vnδ) <δ ,for all i ∈ N. As a consequence
also EGSε c a nb ea p p r o x i m a t e di nt h es a m ew a y .





gij =+ ∞, we can ﬁnd
core elements in an easy way like the so-called utopia payoﬀ in Llorca et al
(2004) for inﬁnite assignment games. In this case, our proposal would be
ui = Pi + Si for each agent i ∈ N, to add the gains with the successors and
the predecessors.
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